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Abstract
This paper specifically examines intergenerational conflict and analyzes an overlapping generations
model of public goods provision from the viewpoint of time-consistency. Public goods are financed
through labor-income and capital-income taxation, thereby distorting savings and the labor supply.
Taxes redistribute income across generations in the form of public goods. Under such a situation, there
emerge dual intergenerational conflicts: the first is related to the amount of public goods and the second
is the tax burden. We then contrast the politico-economic equilibrium with commitment allocation,
and analyze the sources of conflict and time-inconsistency, and attempt to resolve such a conflict by
introducing the concept of ‘intergenerational bargaining’. Our main findings are the following. First,
taxation derived using Lagrange method fails to be time-consistent. Second, depending on bargaining-
power, taxation based on intergenerational bargaining can be time-consistent. Third, we portray the
properties of taxation and public goods provision rules based on intergenerational bargaining.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, in analyzing economic policies such as fiscal or monetary policy, economists
have assumed that the government is a monolithic organization that is intended mainly to
maximize social welfare or the economic growth rate. In this regard, the following points
should be emphasized: First, various entities (voters, bureaucrats, representatives, organiza-
tions, etc.) that are involved in policy determination foster conflicts. Therefore, it is impossi-
ble for the government to organize a policy based on only one situation or position. In other
words, the government cannot avoid determining a policy that incorporates implications of
numerous opinions. Second, even if a policy were derived that maximizes social welfare or
the growth rate, carrying out such a policy with certainty would be difficult: it is hard to
commit to such a policy1). As a result, we cannot regard actual governments as monolithic
organizations, as many economists have assumed. Similarly, looking at the voter side, vari-
ous conflicts exist: young vs. old, unemployed vs. job-holders, rich vs. poor, and so forth2).
Given the existence of such conflicts, “political compromise” is inevitable; it is difficult to
maintain the government commitment entirely. As countermeasures for such a situation, we
find that it is necessary ex post to carry out some kind of coordination policy to attenuate
inefficiencies that result from discretionary policy.
In light of the existence of such conflicts, we find that normative model analysis, in which
the government is assumed to be benevolent in the sense that they maximize social welfare,
is inadequate to determine policy implications because such a model cannot encompass the
nature of the current situation. Therefore, this paper presents analysis of conflicts of interest
among voters, especially intergenerational conflict. In addition, as a problem corresponding
to such a conflict, it is necessary to consider the time-inconsistency problem3) because both
this problem and such conflicts are concurrently related to government commitment. For that
1) Some conflicts exist even within actual governments. As just one example, the Ministry of Finance and
the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare in Japan have frequent conflicts. These two organizations seek
different objectives: the former seeks to decrease the deficit or debt, whereas the latter is responsible for
promoting a social security system, even if it is very costly. Consequently, a contraposition of duties pertains
between the two organizations.
2) As an example of conflicts among voters, we can indicate conflicts surrounding issues of social security,
particularly pension systems.
3) For pioneering studies on this problem, see Kydland and Prescott (1977), Fischer (1980), and Chari, Kehoe
and Prescott (1989).
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reason, this paper describes the investigation of intergenerational conflict in connection with
a time-inconsistency problem.
In turn, let us explain the relationship between this paper and past studies. We use a
two-period version of an overlapping generations (OLG) mode and limit our survey to past
studies that have used a similar model. In the context of intergenerational conflicts4), many
studies center their scope on intertemporal conflict, as explained below. Here, we regard the
intertemporal conflict case, in which a transfer from young people to elderly persons is done
in each period, as in a pay-as-you-go type pension system. This can also be interpreted as a
one-sided transfer case. In this regime, intergenerational conflict arises with the result that
the burden that young people should bear varies depending on when they are born.
Among such studies that posit a one-sided transfer case, some studies such as Casamatta,
Cremer and Pestieau (2000) (pension, transfer from elderly persons to young people) and
Holtz-Eakin, Lovely and Tosun (2004) (education, a transfer from elderly persons to young
people) address policy decisions based on majority voting, whereas Azariadis and Galasso
(2002) investigates how cooperative solutions are attained, with specific attention to policy
decision based on majority voting in combination with veto power. As another method of
policy decision, Grossman and Helpman (1998) introduces lobbying between households
and a myopic government. It is true that numerous studies have specifically addressed in-
tergenerational transfer. However, as already described, we can categorize such studies as
intertemporal conflict cases despite their associated methods of policy decision5).
On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, few studies have analyzed intratemporal
conflict, even though redistributive policies include two-sided transfers as well as one-sided
transfers6). Among such studies, Bassetto (2008) expands past studies described above into a
4) For a survey, see Breyer (1994), Galasso and Profeta (2002), and de Walque (2005). Breyer reviews precedent
studies that specifically examined the assumptions of models and classifies the models accordingly. Some
studies use the median voter theorem, based on the assumption of single-peaked utility, in determining policy.
Related to this issue, see also Galasso and Profeta (2002) and Walque (2005).
5) For studies that incorporate intragenerational conflict as well as intergenerational conflict, we can point out
Tabellini (1991, 2000), who examines substitution between social security (i.e. pension) and debt payment,
using the altruistic model. That study shows that decisions reached by the older generation are not neces-
sarily disadvantageous to young people, depending on the strength of the bequest motive. Lambertini and
Azariadis (2003) specifically evaluates income redistribution from young people to elderly persons and com-
pares open-loop equilibria (corresponding to the case with commitment) and closed-loop equilibria (without
commitment) under the situation in which inequality pertains with regard to productive ability. They show
that the amount of intergenerational and intragenerational transfer is determined according to the degree of
inequality.
6) Here, we view a two-sided transfer as the case in which a transfer from young people to elderly persons and
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two-sided transfer case by incorporating public goods in an OLG model7). In this approach,
an intergenerational conflict arises depending on how the cost of public goods is assigned
to young people and the older generation. Bassetto focuses on this point by incorporating
public goods that serve in the role of intergenerational transfer (redistribution), and illustrates
the possibility of multiple equilibria using numerical simulation8). Although the analysis
in the present paper resemble those of Bassetto (2008) in the respect that an intratemporal
conflict is emphasized, it differs absolutely from his analysis in other respects, as explained
later.
In many of these studies, policy-making is assumed to be based on the median voter the-
orem or majority voting, which have the common disadvantage of abandoning an underdog
or minority group9). Different from those studies, we elucidate intergenerational conflict and
introduce the concept of ‘intergenerational bargaining’, as a solution to such a conflict, ex-
panding the idea of Besley and Ghatak (2001). In this regard, some noteworthy points are
the following: First, the government raises funds through taxation to procure public goods.
Then the government redistributes tax revenues in the form of public goods, which affects
the utility of both young and old generations10). Second, the younger generation has an in-
centive to decrease labor-income taxation, whereas elderly persons also have an incentive to
decrease capital-income taxation because the labor supply is also endogenous in our model.
In other words, an intergenerational conflict arises at this stage. Moreover, each generation
decreases the tax burden without careful consideration, engendering a situation in which the
amounts of public goods provision decrease. As a result, both generations decrease utility,
creating a trade-off between utility derived through the use of public goods and the disutility
that arises from the tax burden. Intergenerational conflict arises in terms of the tax burden.
its reverse are implemented during the same period.
7) For another study, see Renstro¨m (1996), and Pirttila¨ and Tuomala (2001), which incorporate public goods
into the utility function in an OLG model. Renstro¨m derives optimal taxation, whereas Pirttila¨ and Tuomala
derives the public goods provision rule using Mirrlees’ approach. Moreover, Kaas (2003) introduces public
investment into an OLG model. However, those studies neglect the time-inconsistency problem.
8) Nevertheless, that result depends strongly on the specification of utility function. Moreover, this point also
differs from our paper.
9) As another criticism of these means of policy-making, see Grossman and Helpman (1998, section 1). Those
studies point out that this approach ignores the aspect of the parliamentary system, that is, coalition of voters.
Moreover, the median voter theorem has some restrictions. For instance, this theorem is applicable only under
a one-dimensional policy space.
10) From another perspective, we can regard this kind of public good as “intergenerational public goods”, ac-
cording to the term used in Sandler and Smith (1976). For further examination of this point, see remark
1.
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Moreover, regarding the amounts of public goods, an intergenerational conflict also arises
because the amounts of public goods that young and older generations demand generally do
not coincide. In other words, dual intergenerational conflicts emerge. Under such a trade-off,
or because of intergenerational conflicts, how do we determine the public goods provision
rule and taxation?11) To answer such a question, this paper offers a new solution concept:
‘intergenerational bargaining’12).
Our main findings are summarized as follows: First, taxation derived by the Lagrange
method fails to be time-consistent. Second, depending on the value of bargaining power,
such taxation based on intergenerational bargaining can be time-consistent. Third, we showed
properties of taxation and the modified public goods provision rule based on intergenerational
bargaining, which differs from Bassetto (2008).
The organization of this paper is as follows: section 2 describes the model and section 3
derives optimal taxation under the assumption that the government has commitment technol-
ogy, and investigates the properties of such taxation. In section 4, we define the equilibrium
concept and derive the modified public goods provision rule and taxation through intergen-
erational bargaining. Section 5 presents conclusions of this paper and future problems that
require analysis.
2 The model
Our model resembles that of Renstro¨m (1996). We consider an overlapping generations econ-
omy with an endogenous labor supply in which the time horizons are infinite and discrete, as
indexed by t = 0;1;2; ¢ ¢ ¢ . This economy has no uncertainty. We then present a brief descrip-
tion of the respective behaviors of households, firms and the government. Figure 1 depicts an
intuitive structure of this model along with flows of goods and capital.
11) As another study that analyzes the public goods provision rule in an OLG model, we can point out Batina
(1990). However, Batina expands the Samuelson rule under the assumption that public goods affect only the
utility in the young period.
12) As other studies that incorporate intergenerational bargaining, see Bassetto (2008) and Renstro¨m (2002).
However, the former highlights the existence of equilibria indeterminacy and the model of the latter does
not depict the situation of dual intergenerational conflict. Moreover, neither of the two papers highlight the
time-inconsistency problem, as our paper does.
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Figure 1 Structure of the model; External Effect and Flow of Goods and Capital
2.1 Preferences, Technology, and Policy
2.1.1 Production
First, we describe firms’ behavior. We assume that factor markets are perfectly competi-
tive and that firms maximize their profits. Labor and capital stock are used for production;
production technology yields constant returns to scale. Therefore, production functions are
expressed as Yt = F(Kt ;Lt) : ℜ2+ ! ℜ+, where Kt , Lt , and Yt respectively represent capital
stock, labor, and output in aggregate terms. For definitions of capital stock and output per
capita, lt and ˆkt respectively denote L
d
t
Nt and
Kt
Nt . The maximization process yields
Rt =
∂F(ˆkt ; lt)
∂ ˆkt
´ F
ˆk(ˆkt ; lt); wt =
∂F(ˆkt ; lt)
∂ lt
´ Fl(ˆkt ; lt):
In those equations, Rt and wt respectively indicate the rental rate of capital and the real wage
rate.
2.1.2 Government
Next, let us describe government behavior. The government determines taxation and public
expenditure to maximize social welfare. Some assumptions must be made. First, the gov-
ernment finances its expenditure with a tax on capital income and labor income; it is used to
purchase public goods. Second, they cannot make use of lump-sum taxes and a consumption
tax. Therefore, the government’s budget constraint is expressed as
Rtbt +gt = bt+1 +Rtτtst¡1 +wt ltηt ; (1)
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where bt denotes the national debt.
2.1.3 Households
Finally, Households live two periods in a closed-economy with neither population growth
nor a bequest motive. Each generation consists of only a single agent. Dynasties derive
utility from public goods as well as consumption and leisure. For simplicity, preference of
the dynasty’s cohort that remain alive at t period is described by the following additively
separable function:
U(ct ;dt+1;1¡ lt ;gt ;gt+1) = u(ct)+h(gt)+ v(1¡ lt)+ 11+ρ fu(dt+1)+h(gt+1)g; (2)
where ct , dt , lt , gt and ρ respectively denote consumption in the younger period and old,
the labor supply, the amount of public goods at period t, and the rate of time preference.
We assume that the public goods at period t depreciate entirely at the end of that period.
Furthermore, each function is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and
each satisfies the Inada condition. Two kinds of tax exist: a tax on labor income (η), and a tax
on saving (τ). Households that form at date t divide after-tax labor-income into consumption
(ct ) and saving (st ), and consume (dt+1) as after-tax savings when they are old. Consequently,
the young-period and old-period budget constraints are shown respectively as
ct + st = (1¡ηt)wt lt ; dt+1 = (1¡ τt+1)Rt+1st : (3)
Each household is assumed to maximize his or her lifetime utility (2) by choosing a con-
sumption plan and a level of labor supply, subject to the budget constraints of Eq. (3). Taking
into consideration the budget constraint of the government, Eq. (1), the first order conditions
are expressible as
Us =¡u0(ct)+ 11+ρ f
˜Rt+1u0(dt+1)+Rt+1τt+1h0(gt+1)g= 0;and (4a)
Ul = w˜tu0(ct)¡ v0(1¡ lt)+wtηth0(gt) = 0; (4b)
where ˜Rt+1 ´ (1¡τt+1)Rt+1 and w˜t ´ (1¡ηt)wt . By solving these two equations, we obtain
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a savings and labor supply function as follows13):
st = s(w˜t ; ˜Rt+1;gt); lt = l(w˜t ; ˜Rt+1;gt): (5)
?Remark 1 Here, as for the FOCs, Eqs. (4), the criticism might arise that the terms h(gt)
and h(gt+1) should be treated as given because gt represents public goods and does not af-
fect both generations’ behavior. In our setting, we calculate FOCs in this manner because
the government expenditure is dependent upon taxation, which affects households’ behavior.
Note that this calculation is based on the assumption that there is only single agent in each
generation. From this viewpoint, we might regard public service rather than public goods as
used by young and older people who are alive in the same period. Using the term in Sandler
and Smith (1976), we can call these kinds of public services “intergenerational public goods”
(IPG).14)
2.2 Market Equilibrium
We then formulate equilibrium conditions for each market. Because ˆkt ´ KtNt =
Kt
Lt ¢
Lt
Nt = kt lt ,
where N is population, we can write this condition as follows:
1. Commodity market
ct +dt +gt + kt+1lt+1 = Rtkt lt +wt lt (6)
2. Capital market
st ¡bt+1 = kt+1lt+1(= ˆkt+1) (7)
3. Labor market
It is assumed that, in this economy, full employment is founded, meaning that a supply-
demand balance is attained. That is, ldt denotes labor demand.
ldt = lt (8)
13) To close the model, we must describe the behavior of the initial old. As in other periods, the initial old agent
solves
max fu(d1)+h(g1)g
s:t: d1 = (1¡ τ1)R1s0;
given ˜R1; w˜o; s0; and g0:
14) Rangel (2005) cites environmental preservation or R&D as an example of IPG. Unlike this paper, he regards
IPGs as goods that affect the utility of the next generation as well as the current generation.
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2.3 Timing of Decisions
Finally, let us summarize the sequence of decision-making (or political process) as follows:
Stage 1. At period 0, the government determines the tax policy fτ¤t ;η¤t g∞t=0 according to the
tax sequence derived by the Lagrange Method. Note that this taxation is ex ante
optimal. Similarly, fg¤t g∞t=0 is also determined.
Stage 2. At the tth period, a new generation is born.
Stage 3. Based on g¤t determined at stage 1, the elderly and the young who are alive in the
tth period start bargaining over the amount of public goods. Consequently, a new
amount of public goods, g¯t is determined.
Stage 4. After this kind of bargaining, taxation is also determined as fτ¯t ; ¯ηtg in the same
period through bargaining.
Stage 5. The t +1th generation is newly born.
After that, Stages 2–5 are repeated.
3 Dynamic Optimal Allocation
3.1 Benchmark
In this section, as a benchmark, we derive the dynamic optimal allocation (Ramsey allocation)
under the assumption that the government implicitly has a commitment device, following
traditional optimal taxation theory15). This taxation corresponds to Stage 1, as described in
the 2.3 subsection. In this stage, the choice set of the planner is the set of sequences of taxes
and public goods: fτt ;ηt ;gtg∞t=0, in other words, f ˜Rt ; w˜t ;gtg∞t=0. In this section, we assume
that public goods entail no congestion effect, so that both the younger and older generations
can make use of public goods. Next, we define the social welfare function as
SW´
∞
∑
t=0
β t
½
u(ct)+ v(1¡ lt)+h(gt)+ 11+ρ fu(dt+1)+h(gt+1)g
¾
+
1
1+ρ fu(d0)+h(g0)g;
15) In other words, this concept is identical to the open-loop solution.
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where β (< 1) stands for the social discount factor. Then, the constraints are summarized as
follows:16)
1. First-order conditions: These equations can be interpreted as households’ response
functions.8<:Us =¡u0(ct)+
1
1+ρ f
˜Rt+1u0(dt+1)+(Rt+1¡ ˜Rt+1)h0(gt+1)g= 0;
Ul = w˜tu0(ct)¡ v0(1¡ lt)+(wt ¡ w˜t)h0(gt) = 0
(4’)
2. Commodity market
ct +dt +gt + kt+1lt+1 = Rtkt lt +wt lt (6)
3. Government budget constraint
Based on the fact that F(¢) is homogeneous of degree one, we can transform Eq. (1)
as:17)
gt = F(ˆkt ; lt)¡ ˜Rtkt lt ¡ w˜t lt + kt lt +bt+1¡ ˜Rtbt (1’)
More formally, the problem of the government can be rewritten as
max
fw˜t ; ˜Rt ;bt ;gtg
SW
s:t: Eqs: (1’); (4’); (6); given ˆk0 > 0:
(IPG)
Setting fµ1t ;µ2t ;κt ;λtg as the Lagrange multiplier, letL be the Lagrange function as
L =
∞
∑
t=0
β t
h
fu(ct)+ v(1¡ lt)+h(gt)+ 11+ρ fu(dt+1)+h(gt+1)g
+µ1tf¡u0(ct)+ 11+ρ f
˜Rt+1u0(dt+1)+(Rt+1¡ ˜Rt+1)h0(gt+1)gg
+µ2tfw˜tu0(ct)¡ v0(1¡ lt)+(wt ¡ w˜t)h0(gt)g
+κt
©
gt ¡F(ˆkt ; lt)+ ˜Rtkt lt + w˜t lt ¡bt+1 + ˜Rtbt
ª
+λt(Rtkt lt +wt lt ¡ ct ¡dt ¡gt ¡ kt+1lt+1)
i
:
Note that κt and λt are interpreted respectively as the marginal social value and the
marginal rate of substitution. Moreover, µ1t and µ2t can be interpreted respectively as the
16) If we take the borrowing constraints into consideration, another condition, kt ¸ 0, is added, but we ignore it
in this paper.
17) This equation is derived in the following manner.
gt = Rt τt st¡1 +wt lt ηt +bt+1¡Rt bt
= Rt τt(kt lt +bt)+wt lt ηt +bt+1¡ ˜Rt bt (.:. eq.(7))
= F(ˆkt ; lt)¡ ˜Rt kt lt ¡ w˜t lt +bt+1¡ ˜Rt bt
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sensitivity for the saving and labor supply. Noting that state variables are kt and bt , we can
derive the first-order conditions (and the transversality condition) as follows18):
w˜t : µ2tfu0(ct)+ 11+ρ (
wt
w˜t
¡1)h0(gt)g=
µ
κt ¡ wt
w˜t
λt
¶
lt (9a)
˜Rt :
1
1+ρ (
Rt
˜Rt
¡1)µ1;t¡1h0(gt+1)+ µ1;t¡1β
1
1+ρ u
0(dt+1)+κt(kt lt +bt)
+λt
Rt
˜Rt
kt lt = 0 (9b)
bt : ¡κt ˜Rt + κt¡1β = 0 (9c)
lt : ¡v0(1¡ lt)+µ2tv00(1¡ lt)+κt( ˜Rtkt + w˜t ¡ kt)
+λt(Rtkt +wt)¡ λt¡1β kt+1 = 0 (9d)
ˆkt : κt(¡Rt + ˜Rt) +λtRt ¡ λt¡1β = 0 (9e)
gt : h0(gt)+
1
β
1
1+ρ fh
0(gt+1)+(Rt ¡ ˜Rt+1)µ1;t¡1h00(gt+1)g
+µ2t(1¡ w˜t)h00(gt)+κt ¡λt = 0 (9f)
Finally, the transversality condition is
lim
t!∞ β
tλtkt = 0:
18) For the first-order condition with respect to w˜t , we use the fact that
dwt
dw˜t
=
1
1¡ηt =
wt
w˜t
because w˜t ´
(1¡ηt)wt . The same calculation applies for ˜Rt+1.
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At the steady state, setting ˆkt = ˆkt+1 = ¢ ¢ ¢= ˆk for instance,
(9a) : µ2fu0(c)+ 11+ρ (
w
w˜
¡1)h(g)g=
³
κ¡ w
w˜
λ
´
l (10a)
(9b) : 1
1+ρ (
R
˜R
¡1)µ1h0(g)+ µ1β u
0(d)+κ(kl +b)+λ R
˜R
kl = 0 (10b)
(9c) : ¡βκ ˜R+κ = 0 (10c)
(9d) : ¡v0(1¡ l)+µ2v00(1¡ l)+κ( ˜Rk+ w˜¡ k)+λt(Rk+wt)¡ λβ k = 0 (10d)
(9e) : κ(¡R+ ˜R) +λR¡ λβ = 0 (10e)
(9f) : h0(g)+ 1β
1
1+ρ fh
0(g)+(1¡ ˜R)µ1h00(g)g+µ2(1¡ w˜)h00(g)+κ¡λ = 0(10f)
(4’) : ¡u0(c)+ 1
1+ρ f
˜Ru0(d)+(R¡ ˜R)µ1h0(g)g= 0 (10g)
(4’) : w˜u0(c)¡ v0(1¡ l)+(1¡ w˜)¡h0(g) = 0 (10h)
(1’) : g¡F(ˆk; l)+ ˜Rkl + w˜l¡ kl¡b+ ˜Rb = 0 (10i)
(6) : Rkl +wl¡ c¡d¡g¸ 0 (10j)
From these equations, we obtain the following set of solution paths:
fc¤t ;d¤t+1; l¤t ; ˜R¤t ;b¤t ; w˜¤t ;k¤t ;g¤t ;µ¤1t ;µ¤2t ;κ¤t ;λ ¤t g∞t=0:
In this paper, we designate solutions derived by Lagrangian method as “commitment solu-
tions.” From these equations, we obtain
τ¤t = 1¡
dt
Rt ˆkt+1
; η¤t = 1¡
ct + ˆkt+1
wt
: (11)
We then discuss some features of the Ramsey allocation in the following subsection.
3.2 Characterization of Commitment Solution
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibrium tax sequence, derived in the above way.
Here, we show the following claim.
Proposition 1 The commitment solution, derived by Lagrange method, has the following
properties:
1. This taxation fails to be time-consistent.
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2. This taxation presents intergenerational inequality of the amount of public goods.
Proof See appendix A.1.
?Remark 2 For the first result, we have three remarks. First, this result differs from Okuno
and Yakita (1983)19). Their model assumes a naive expectation in relation to the amount
of public goods provision, which means that the amount of public provision at period t
equals that at t + 1 period. Therefore, the time-inconsistency problem does not occur in
their model. Second, the fact that the open-loop solution generally fails to be time-consistent
is well known. However, Xie (1997) reported that there is a possibility that even an open-
loop solution is time-consistent, so it is necessary to check whether the above solution is
time-inconsistent or not. Third, intuitively, time-inconsistency occurs in this model for the
following two reasons.
1. Cost allocation of public goods varies depending on when households are born.
2. Existence of the state variable, emphasized in this paper as physical capital.
The first point says that the source of time-inconsistency is conflict of interests, as indicated
in Drazen (2000, pp.110–113). Furthermore, the second is more important. The property of
variables changes from ‘control variables’ to a ‘state variable’ after some time has passed.
In other words, such variables can be treated as a control variable until some period; sub-
sequently, this can be treated merely as a state variable. In other words, this shows that the
elasticity of a tax-base ex ante differs from that ex post.
?Remark 3 As for the second result, it is necessary to define a situation that has no inter-
generational conflict. In this paper, a situation with intergenerational conflict is considered
as follows. The amount of provided public goods differs from the level that each generation
desires. In other words, taxation maximizes the sum of utility of young people and elderly
persons as a fair policy. That is, at t period, a certain kind of taxation, fτt ;ηt ;gtg does not
agree with fτ¤t ;η¤t ;g¤t g, which maximizes the social welfare. Formally, we must show that
the above commitment solution differs from that defined as follows:
19) Moreover, in the model of Okuno and Yakita (1983), the labor supply is not endogenous, which differs from
our model.
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Defnition 1 (Equilibrium with Intragenerational Equal Treatment) The set of allocation
with intragenerational equal treatment satisfies the following three conditions:
(i) Together with the situation in which both the generations’ utility and firms’ profits are
maximized,
(ii) The allocation satisfies the following:
max
fw˜t ; ˜Rtg
U(ct ;gt ;1¡ lt)+U(dt ;gt)
s:t: Eqs: (1); (3):
(iii) The following markets clear.
Commodity Market: Eq. (6), Capital Market: Eq. (7), Labor Market: Eq. (8)
For a more detailed proof, see the second half of A.1.
4 Intergenerational Bargaining
In the previous section, we have analyzed the taxation and public goods provision rule under
the assumption of no congestion effect and the government has a commitment device. We
have shown that taxation derived by the Lagrange method, which is determined at the initial
point, fails to be time-consistent. Consequently, the government has an incentive to change
the policy at some point20). In this section, we introduce the concept of ‘intergenerational
bargaining’, which is an alternative to Lagrange method or majority voting. In what follows,
first, we define the equilibrium concept (i.e. politico-economic equilibrium). Second, we
formulate a problem in which older and younger generations should solve and derive the
modified public goods provision rule. Finally, we examine the properties of the modified
public goods provision rule and explain the relationship using the Samuelson rule.
4.1 Equilibrium Definition
According to Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997), let us define the equilibrium concept
(politico-economic equilibrium21)).
20) One might infer that the government should carry out a no-commitment policy. However, it is not desirable
to do so in terms of credibility. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to change the policy repeatedly because
of the cost of policy-change. Third, this way of method does not show how the government should change
the policy in concrete form.
21) This concept corresponds to so-called Markov-perfect equilibrium. These conditions are dependent on the
relationship between the t and t +1 period. Therefore, this concept meets the Markov property.
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Defnition 2 (Politico-Economic Equilibrium) A politico-economic equilibrium is a
sequence fw˜t ; lt ;ct ;dt ; ˜Rt+1;gtg∞t=0 that accords with the following.
(i) Given the sequence fτ¤t ;η¤t ;g¤t g∞t=1, each agent (young or elderly) determines the policy
variables that maximize their individual utility. That is, the optimal policy variables
meet the following maximization problem:
² Young people:
max
½
u(ct)+ v(1¡ lt)+h(gt)+ 11+ρ fu(dt+1)+h(gt+1)g
¾
² Elderly persons:
max
½
1
1+ρ fu(dt)+h(gt)g
¾
Based on the solutions of such problems, the tax policy by which both generations are
alive in the same period as that in which demand is determined. Moreover, the policy
fgsg∞s=t+1, which is also achieved through the above method, is repeated after t + 1-
period.
(ii) Based on the bargaining solutions, the government determines the policy.
(iii) Finally, the following markets clear.
Commodity Market: Eq. (6), Capital Market: Eq. (7), Labor Market: Eq. (8)
This equilibrium concept is superior to the Ramsey allocation discussed in the previous
section in the following two respects: First, by its definition of Markov property, the above
equilibrium meets the property of time-consistency and neither young nor elder agents have
an incentive to deviate from the bargaining solution because it is based on the solution of
utility maximization problem. Second, compared with the Ramsey allocation from the view-
point of intergenerational fairness, this equilibrium does not engender much intergenerational
inequality because this taxation is based on the behavior of living generations in the same pe-
riod. As for this equilibrium concept, note that the government is assumed to be myopic in
the sense that they ignore the long-run effect and emphasize only the effect of a single pe-
riod. This situation can be interpreted as a one-period commitment. Hereafter, we search the
public goods provision rule and the taxation that meets the above properties.
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t¡1 t t +1 t +2
fτt ;ηt ;gtg
bargaining at t
fτt+1;ηt+1;gt+1g
bargaining at t +1
Figure 2 Schematic of intergenerational bargaining
4.2 Bargaining Problem between Elderly Persons and Young People
In this section, we formulate the concept of intergenerational bargaining. The intuitive struc-
ture of this bargaining is depicted in Fig. 2. In this paper, the amount of public goods pro-
vision as well as taxation is assumed to be determined by a kind of bargaining, especially
Nash-bargaining. In more detail, we assume that both generations solve their own problems
and determine the amount of public goods through bargaining. Subsequently, the government
determines the public goods provision rule22).
4.2.1 Optimal Choice of Young Individuals
First, the problem for young people is summarized as follows: The younger generation de-
termines the amount of public goods to maximize the lifetime utility: the sum of utilities of
younger and older people23). In summary, young people face the following problem:
max
gt ;ηt
½
u(ct)+ v(1¡ lt)+h(gt)+ 11+ρ fu(dt+1)+h(gt+1)g
¾
s:t: Eqs: (1’):(3)
(IPyoung)
4.2.2 Optimal Choice of Old Individuals
Next, let us derive the amount of public goods for elderly persons. Note that elderly persons
are myopic in the sense that they consider only their own utility in old age. In this case, we
22) This type of bargaining is also adopted by Besley and Coate (2003).
23) True of the old case that is discussed later, we specifically assess the amount of public goods, given the
taxation, fηt ;τtg.
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can define the amount of public goods as the solution of the following problem:
max
gt ;τt
1
1+ρ fu(dt)+h(gt)g
s:t: Eqs: (1’); (3)
(IPold)
4.2.3 Determination of the Amount of Public Goods and the Tax Burden through Bar-
gaining
As described in section 1, we do not adopt policy-making based on majority voting but rather
that based on intergenerational bargaining. Especially, we adopt policy-making based on
Nash-type bargaining24). Although situations in which bargaining does not progress are con-
ceivable, we eliminate such cases from consideration in this paper. Each generation faces the
following bargaining problem25).
Let the bargaining power of young people and elderly persons at t period respectively
represent α , 1¡α (0 < α < 1). Players maximize the following Nash products:
² Public goods : gt
g¯t ´ argmaxgt (U(ct ;dt+1;1¡ lt ;gt ;gt+1))
α ¢ (U(dt ;gt))1¡α (12)
² Tax burden : (τt ;ηt )
( ¯ηt ; τ¯t)´ argmaxηt ;τt = (U(ct ;dt+1;1¡ lt ;gt ;gt+1))
α ¢ (U(dt ;gt))1¡α (13)
Through transformation into logarithmic form, let us solve the following two problems:
max
gt
Φ1 = α ¢ lnfU(ct ;dt+1;1¡ lt ;gt ;gt+1)g+(1¡α) ¢ lnfU(dt ;gt)g
s:t: (1’); (4’); (6); (14)
and
max
ηt ;τt
Φ2 = α ¢ lnfU(ct ;dt+1;1¡ lt ;gt ;gt+1)g+(1¡α) ¢ lnfU(dt ;gt)g
s:t: (1’); (4’); (6): (15)
Now, we are ready to present the following claim:
24) As for the Nash Bargaining, see Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986). Note that the outside option of
both elder generations and young persons is 0 under this setting.
25) Before entering analysis, we explain the role of debt. Taxation through intergenerational bargaining does not
necessarily cover the amount of public goods that is determined by bargaining. We introduce debt to cover
that shortfall.
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Proposition 2 fτ¯t ; ¯ηt ; g¯tg meets the following properties.
1. fτ¯t ; ¯ηt ; g¯tg satisfies conditions of the politico-economic equilibrium.
2. Each solution achieved through intergenerational bargaining meets the following
properties.
∂ g¯t
∂α > 0;
∂ τ¯t
∂α > 0;
∂ ¯ηt
∂α < 0 (16)
Proof See appendix A.2.
These second properties inform us that the amount of public goods provision and capital
income tax increase as the bargaining power of young generation becomes stronger, while
labor income tax decreases. The intuition behind these results is that, for the relationship be-
tween capital-income tax and bargaining power, as the bargaining power, α , becomes larger,
which might imply that the voice of the younger generation becomes larger, they have an
incentive to reduce the burden caused by labor income tax and impose a heavier burden on
elderly persons; the older generation is compelled to bear a bigger burden because of the
capital income tax, and it is the opposite. For the amount of public goods, the intuitive expla-
nation is as follows: Because young persons live two periods and thereby live longer than the
elderly group, they have more incentive to make use of public goods than do elderly persons.
Incidentally, is there a possibility that the solution derived by dynamic programming (DP)
and the bargaining solution coincide? If so, the time-inconsistency problem is solvable by
bargaining26). The following proposition answers such a question.
Proposition 3 There exists “α” such that the solution derived by dynamic programming
and that by intergenerational bargaining coincide. In other words, depending on the value
of bargaining power, taxation derived through bargaining can meet the property of time-
consistency.
Proof To prove this claim, we must show that these solutions through intergenerational bar-
gaining coincide with the feedback solution. See also appendix A.3 for greater detail.
26) Note that the DP solution meets the property of time-consistency.
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4.3 Derivation of the Modified Samuelson Rule through Bargaining
In the previous subsection, we have investigated the properties of policy variables through
bargaining. However, it is unlikely that households can determine all policy variables through
bargaining. In this subsection, we then derive taxation rule based on intergenerational bar-
gaining under the case that only the amount of public goods is determined through bargain-
ing. Hereafter, we define that problem of government taking the discussion in the previous
subsection into consideration. To sum up, the problem for the government is the following.
max SW (IPG1)
s:t: Eqs: (1’); (6); (30)
As in the previous section, we construct the following LagrangianH , setting fκt ;λt ;φtg
as Lagrange multipliers:
H =
∞
∑
t=0
β t
h
fu(ct)+ v(1¡ lt)+h(gt)+ 11+ρ fu(dt+1)+h(gt+1)g
+κt
©
gt ¡F(ˆkt ; lt)+ ˜Rtkt lt + w˜t lt ¡bt+1 + ˜Rtbt
ª
+λt(Rtkt lt +wt lt ¡ ct ¡dt ¡gt ¡ kt+1lt+1)
+φtfα ¢ h
0(gt)¡u0(ct)¡ v0(1¡ lt)
U(ct ;dt+1;1¡ lt ;gt ;gt+1) +(1¡α) ¢
h0(gt)¡u0(dt)
U(dt ;gt)
g
i
We then derive the following first-order conditions:
w˜t : ¡ltu0(ct)+h0(gt)+φt
½
α
h00(gt)
fU(ct ;dt+1;1¡ lt ;gt ;gt+1)g2 +(1¡α)
h00(gt)
fU(dt ;gt)g2
¾
=
µ
κt ¡ wt
w˜t
λt
¶
lt (17a)
˜Rt :
1
1+ρ u
0(dt+1)+κt(kt lt +bt)+λt
Rt
˜Rt
kt lt
+φt
½
α
h00(gt)
fU(ct ;dt+1;1¡ lt ;gt ;gt+1)g2 +(1¡α)
h00(gt)
fU(dt ;gt)g2
¾
= 0
(17b)
gt : h0(gt)+κt ¡λt +φtfα h
00(gt)
fU(ct ;dt+1;1¡ lt ;gt ;gt+1)g2 +
(1¡α)h00(gt)
fU(dt ;gt)g2 g= 0
(17c)
bt : ¡κt ˜Rt + κt¡1β = 0 (17d)
ˆkt : κt(¡Rt + ˜Rt) +λtRt ¡ λt¡1β = 0 (17e)
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As in the previous section, we obtain the following conditions at the steady state.
(17a) : ¡lu0(c)+h0(g)+
³
κ¡ w
w˜
λ
´
l +φ
½
α
h00(g)
fU(c;d;1¡ l;g;g)g2 +
(1¡α)h00(g)
fU(d;g)g2
¾
= 0
(18a)
(17b) : 1
1+ρ u
0(d)+κ(kl +b)+λ R
˜R
kl +φ
½
α
h00(g)
fU(c;d;1¡ l;g;g)g2 +
(1¡α)h00(g)
fU(d;g)g2
¾
= 0
(17c) : h0(g)+κ¡λ +φf αh
00(g)
fU(c;d;1¡ l;g;g)g2 +
(1¡α)h00(g)
fU(d;g)g2 g= 0 (18b)
(17d) : ¡βκ ˜R+κ = 0 (18c)
(17e) : κ(¡R+ ˜R¡1) +λR¡ λβ = 0 (18d)
We define the solution by ? as follows.
fc?t ;d?t+1; l?t ; ˜R?t ;b?t ; w˜?t ;k?t ;g?t ;κ?t ;λ ?t ;φ ?t g∞t=0
We refer to the above solution as “modified public goods provision rule”. Then, we show
the following claim:
Proposition 4 The above modified optimal taxation to finance public goods in the long run
is characterized as
u0(c)
h0(g) +
u0(d)
h0(g) = 1+µ2
u0(c)
h0(g) ¡κ(k+
b
l )¡λ
R
˜R
k: (19)
?Remark 4 The left side of the equation shown above (19) denotes the sum of the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and public goods. Regarding the right side of this
equation, we can infer that this result reflects the following channels.
² the cost of public goods distribution, which corresponds to the first term of R.H.S. of
eq.(19).
² Pigou effect – The sum effect of (i)+(ii), which corresponds to the second and third
term of R.H.S. of eq.(19).
(i) the negative effect of labor-income tax – distortion in labor supply
(ii) the negative effect of capital-income tax – distortion in saving
² the positive effect of public goods, which corresponds to the fourth term of R.H.S. of
eq.(19).
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Especially, the third effect has a positive effect on the utility of both young and elderly per-
sons. Moreover, we can regard this result in terms of the Samuelson Rule, which means that
∑i MRSi = MRT , where MRS and MRT respectively show the marginal rate of substitution
and marginal rate of transformation.
Proof From eq. (18c), we obtain
β ˜R = 1:
Eliminating Φ from eq.(18a) and eq.(18b), we have
lu0(c)+ 1
1+ρ u
0(d) = h0(g)+
³
κ¡ w
w˜
λ
´
l¡κ(kl +b)¡λ R
˜R
kl
Dividing both sides of the above equation by l£h0(g), we have
u0(c)
h0(g) +
1
1+ρ
u0(d)
h0(g) = 1+
³
κ¡ w
w˜
λ
´
¡κ(k+ bl )¡λ
R
˜R
k (20)
Here, using the following equations, those are the Eqs. (18a)-(18c) as the first order condi-
tions,
u0(c)¡fµ1¡µ2w˜ltgu00(c)¡λ = 0 (21a)
u0(d)¡λ ˜Ru00(d)¡λ = 0 (21b)
µ2u0(c) =
³
κ¡ w
w˜
λ
´
l (21c)
We can rewrite eq.(20) as
u0(c)
h0(g) +
u0(d)
h0(g) = 1+µ2
u0(c)
h0(g) ¡κ(k+
b
l )¡λ
R
˜R
k:
This concludes the proof.
?Remark 5
1. In relation to this proposition, we can adopt the following perspective. Considering
that the structure of intergenerational bargaining proceeds after the t+1 period, we can
regard this model as having identical structure to an ordinary repeated game. There-
fore, we can conclude that the cooperative solution is attainable by applying Kandori
(1992)’s discussion. Thereby, the time-consistent solution is obtainable.
2. As discussed in Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999), taxing capital income is not prefer-
able from the viewpoint of efficiency. However, we showed that this way of fund-
raising of public goods is justifiable from the viewpoint of intergenerational conflict.
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4.4 Discussion
In this subsection, let us point out some remarks as for intergenerational bargaining proposed
in this section.
?the Specific Example of Bargaining Power
Applying the concept of intergenerational bargaining to reality, bargaining power (α) can be
regarded as the strength of the coalition within the congress in this paper or simply stated, the
political power of young agents. More concretely speaking, in the congress (or for instance,
the national diet), the bargaining power corresponds to the ratio of assembly members, to
whom young persons give support. If the voter turnout of young persons is high, there is a
greater possibility that the assembly members, to whom young persons lend support, can win
an election. Therefore, from another perspective, the bargaining power also corresponds to
the approval rating among young persons for the policy that the government determines.
?How can we discover the optimal value of bargaining power?
On the other hand, proposition 3 says that depending on the value of the bargaining power,
the bargaining solution coincides with the DP solution. However, another question remains
to be discussed as follows: How can we find the optimal value of α that satisfies such a
property? Our proposal is as follows: If the government seeks to attain such a value of
bargaining power, they should merely adjust the difference of preferences to the tax burden
and the amount of public goods between elderly and young persons by introducing a proper
policy that is supportable by young people.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have presented analysis of dynamic optimal taxation and a public goods pro-
vision rule under the presence of intergenerational conflict by introducing a solution concept
for such a conflict as an alternative to majority voting or lobbying. What we have shown in
this paper is summarized as the following: First, taxation derived using the Lagrange Method
fails to be time-consistent. Second, depending on bargaining-power, taxation based on inter-
generational bargaining can be time-consistent. Third, we investigated properties of taxation
and a public goods provision rule based on intergenerational bargaining.
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Finally, we conclude this paper by pointing out possible directions for extending its anal-
ysis and implications. First, in Nash-bargaining, bargaining power is given exogenously;
for that reason, we are compelled to endogenize it as a next step. Second, considering the
existence of inequality related to ability, income, and labor supply, we must also analyze
intragenerational conflict27). Finally, with regard to policy-making, we must also consider
other political decision-making modalities including ideology, veto-power, rent-seeking, and
so forth.
Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
?Proposition 1.1 First, we begin to prove Proposition 1.1. This fashion of proof is based
on that of Kinai (2005). To prove this claim, we must demonstrate that the solution de-
rived using the Lagrange method (open-loop solution) differs from that by dynamic program-
ming (closed-loop solution). Next, we rewrite the maximization problem that the government
should solve.
max
fw˜t ; ˜Rt ;gtg
∞
∑
t=0
β t
½
u(ct)+ v(1¡ lt)+h(gt)+ 11+ρ fu(dt+1)+h(gt+1)g
¾
Using Eq. (5), the budget constraints of the government can be written as: 28)
bt+1 =¡F(s(w˜t¡1;bt)¡bt ; l(w˜t ; ˜Rt+1))+ ˜Rtfs(w˜t¡1;bt)¡btg+ w˜t l(w˜t ; ˜Rt+1)+ ˜Rbt +gt :
(22)
Now, let us define qt as follows by differentiating Eq. (22) with respect to bt+1.
1¡ (wt ¡ w˜t) ∂ lt∂ ˜Rt+1
∂ ˜Rt+1
∂bt+1
´ qt (23)
Hereafter, using qt , we advance our calculation as follows: Using Eq. (5), the budget
27) As an existing study that presents a similar viewpoint, see Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007).
28) This transformation is based on the fact that we can rewrite s(w˜t¡1;bt) as F(s(w˜t¡1;bt)), using the production
function, F(kt ;Lt).
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constraints of the government can be written as:
qt ¢ ∂bt+1∂ w˜t = lt +(w˜t ¡wt)
µ ∂ lt
∂ w˜t
+
∂ lt
∂ ˜Rt+1
∂ ˜Rt+1
∂bt+1
¶
(24a)
qt ¢ ∂bt+1∂ ˜Rt
= st (24b)
qt ¢ ∂bt+1∂gt = 1 (24c)
Next, we obtain the following equations by differentiating Eq. (22) with respect to two
state variables: bt and w˜t¡1.
qt ¢ ∂bt+1∂bt = (
˜Rt ¡Rt) ∂ st∂ ˜Rt
∂ ˜Rt
∂bt
+1 (24d)
qt ¢ ∂bt+1∂ w˜t¡1 = (
˜Rt ¡Rt)
· ∂ st
∂ w˜t¡1
+
∂ st
∂ ˜Rt
∂ ˜Rt
∂ w˜t¡1
¸
(24e)
Setting the value function as Ω(kt ;gt¡1), we establish the Bellman Equation as follows.
Ωt(kt ;gt¡1) = maxfw˜t ; ˜Rt ;gtg
h
fu(w˜t lt ¡ s(w˜t¡1;bt))+ v(1¡ lt)+h(gt)g+ 11+ρ fu(
˜Rt+1s(w˜t¡1;bt))+h(gt+1)g
+βΩt+1(kt+1;gt)
i
(25)
s:t: Eq:(22)
From Eq. (25), we derive the first-order conditions with respect to w˜t , ˜Rt , and gt .
qt ltu0(ct)+β ∂Ωt(kt+1;gt+1)∂bt+1
½
lt +(w˜t ¡wt)
µ ∂ lt
∂wt
+
∂ lt
∂ lt
∂ ˜Rt+1
∂wt
¶¾
= 0 (26a)
qt
1
1+ρ
∂ ˜Rt+1
∂ ˜Rt
u0(dt+1)+β ∂Ωt+1(gt+1; w˜t)∂bt+1 st = 0 (26b)
qt
∂ ˜Rt+1
∂gt
fh0(gt)+ 11+ρ h
0(gt+1)g+β ∂Ωt+1(gt+1; w˜t)∂gt+1 = 0 (26c)
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Using the envelope theorem yields the Benveniste-Scheinkman condition as29)
qt ¢ ∂Ωt∂bt = qt
½
¡u0(ct) ∂ st∂bt +
1
1+ρ u
0(dt+1) ˜Rt+1
∂ st
∂bt
¾
+β ∂Ωt+1∂bt
½
( ˜Rt ¡Rt) ∂ st∂ ˜Rt
∂ ˜Rt
∂bt
+Rt
¾
(26d)
qt ¢ ∂Ωt∂ w˜t¡1 = qt
½
¡u0(ct) ∂ st∂bt
∂bt
∂ w˜t¡1
+
1
1+ρ u
0(dt+1) ˜Rt+1
∂ st
∂bt
∂bt
∂ w˜t¡1
¾
+β ∂Ωt+1∂bt+1 (
˜Rt ¡Rt)
· ∂ st
∂ ˜Rt
+β ∂ st∂ ˜Rt
∂ ˜Rt
∂ w˜t¡1
¸
(26e)
Now we show that the solution derived in this manner differs from that obtained using
Lagrange method. From Eq. (10c), we obtain
β ˜R = 1: (27)
Substituting Eq. (23), and Eqs. (26a)–(26d) into the above equations yields the following.
(23) : 1¡ (w¡ w˜) ∂ l∂ ˜R
∂ ˜R
∂b ´ q (28a)
(26a) : q ¢ lu0(c)+β ∂Ω(b; w˜)∂b
½
l +(w˜¡w)
µ ∂ l
∂w +
∂ l
∂ ˜R
∂ ˜R
∂b
¶¾
= 0 (28b)
(26b) : q ¢ 1
1+ρ
∂ ˜R
∂ ˜Ru
0(d)+β ∂Ω(b; w˜)∂b s = 0 () q
1
1+ρ u
0(d)+β ∂Ω∂b s = 0(28c)
(26c) : qfh0(g)+ 1
1+ρ h
0(g)g+β ∂Ω∂g = 0 (28d)
(26d) : q ¢ ∂Ω∂b = q
½
¡u0(c) ∂ s∂b +
1
1+ρ u
0(d) ˜R ∂ s∂b
¾
+β ∂Ω∂b
½
( ˜R¡R) ∂ s∂ ˜R
∂ ˜R
∂b +R
¾
(28e)
From these equations, eliminating q and Ω(¢), we obtain
∂Ω
∂b = q
½
¡u0(c) ∂ s∂b +
1
1+ρ u
0(d) ˜R ∂ s∂b
¾
+β ∂Ω∂b
½
( ˜R¡R) ∂ s∂b +R
¾
() q
½
¡u0(c) ∂ s∂b +
1
1+ρ u
0(d) ˜R ∂ s∂b
¾
+
∂Ω
∂b (1¡βR)(
∂ s
∂b ¡1) = 0 (29)
From Eq. (28c),
∂Ω
∂b =¡
1
β sq
1
1+ρ u
0(d):
29) These equations can be derived through differentiation with respect to two state variables: bt and w˜t¡1.
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By substituting this equation into Eq. (29), we obtain½
¡u0(c)+ 1
1+ρ u
0(d) ˜R
¾ ∂ s
∂b +
½
¡ 1β s
1
1+ρ u
0(d)
¾
(1¡βR)( ∂ s∂b ¡1) = 0
()
½
¡u0(c)+ 1
1+ρ u
0(d) ˜R¡ 1β s
1
1+ρ u
0(d)(1¡βR)
¾
(¡1) =
½
¡ 1β s
1
1+ρ u
0(d)
¾
(1¡βR)
() u0(c)+f ˜R+ 1β s (1¡βR)g
1
1+ρ u
0(d) =
½
¡ 1β s
1
1+ρ u
0(d)
¾
(1¡βR)
() u0(c)+ ˜R 1
1+ρ u
0(d) =¡2
½
1
β s
1
1+ρ u
0(d)
¾
(1¡βR) 6= 0:
Thereby, we find that this equation does not necessarily coincide with Eq. (10g) because
βR = 1 is not satisfied. We find that Eq. (27) is not necessarily satisfied. This result means
that the first-order conditions obtained using the Lagrange method do not coincide with those
by DP: this proposition holds. This concludes the proof.
?Proposition 1.2 We next proceed to prove proposition 1.2. First, we obtained paths of
capital-income and labor-income taxes; fτtg∞t=0 and fηtg∞t=0 in the section 3.1. Now, let us
derive taxation fτt ;ηtg that maximizes the sum of the utility of younger and older generation
by solving the following problem:
(τˆt ; ηˆt) = max
τt ;ηt
[θfu(ct)+ v(1¡ lt)g+h(gt)+fu(dt)+h(gt)g]
s:t: Eqs:(3); (1’); (7) (IP1)
In the first-term, the parameter θ is the relative weight that politicians attach to the well-being
of the elderly. In the case of θ = 1, we can regard this allocation as that with intragenerational
equal treatment. By solving the above problem with θ = 1, we can easily show τˆt 6= τ¤t ,
ηˆt 6= η¤t .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
?Proposition 2.1 To prove this claim, we show that fg¯t ; τ¯t ; ¯ηtgmeet conditions of politico-
economic equilibrium (i, ii, and iii).
(i) Because fg¯t ; τ¯t ; ¯ηtg are also a solution of both generations, this solution meets the first
condition.
(ii) Because this solution is an aggregation, the second condition holds.
(iii) Clearly, each market-clearing condition holds.
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Therefore, we find that this solution meets the three conditions.
?Proposition 2.2 First, for public goods, let us define Hg as
Hg ´ ∂Φ1∂gt = α ¢
h0(gt)¡ (v0(1¡ lt)+u0(ct))
U(ct ;dt+1;1¡ lt ;gt ;gt+1) +(1¡α) ¢
h0(gt)¡u0(dt)
fu(dt)+h(gt)g = 0: (30)
By applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain the following:
∂ g¯t
∂α =¡
∂Hg
∂α
∂Hg
∂ g¯t
¯¯¯¯
other variables constant
> 0:
Next, let us turn to the bargaining problem with respect to taxation. Define Hτ and Hη as
Hτ ´ ∂Φ2∂τt = α
¡u0(dt)+Rt+1sth0(gt)
U(ct ;dt+1;1¡ lt ;gt ;gt+1) ¢
∂Rt
∂ ˜Rt
+(1¡α) Rt+1sth
0(gt)
fu(dt)+h(gt)g ¢
∂Rt
∂ ˜Rt
= 0
(31a)
Hη ´ ∂Φ2∂ηt = α
¡u0(ct)+wt lth0(gt)
U(ct ;dt+1;1¡ lt ;gt ;gt+1) ¢
∂wt
∂ w˜t
+(1¡α) wt lth
0(gt)
u(dt)+h(gt)
¢ ∂wt∂ w˜t = 0:
(31b)
From these equations, by applying the implicit function theorem, we then have the follow-
ing result:
∂ τ¯t
∂α =¡
∂Hτ
∂α
∂Hτ
∂τ
¯¯¯¯
other variables constant
> 0;
∂ ¯ηt
∂α =¡
∂Hη
∂α
∂Hη
∂η
¯¯¯¯
other variables constant
< 0:
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We then show that the solutions derived by intergenerational bargaining coincide with those
obtained by dynamic programming, depending on the value of α . Let us compare Eqs. (30)–
(31) with Eqs. (25a)–(25e). Then, let us interlock Eq. (30) and Eq. (25c) and define that
interlocked equation as F(α;kt ;kt+1). That is,
F(α;kt ;kt+1)´ the R.H.S. of eq.(30)¡ the R.H.S. of eq. (25c):
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We then obtain the following using the assumption that α is within the interval, (0;1).
Thereby, we have
F(0) ¢F(1)< 0: (32)
Using the Intermediate Value Theorem, we then find that this equation has at least one
solution within the interval, α 2 (0;1). Therefore, this policy through bargaining is time-
consistent, depending on the value of α . Regarding the tax burden, fτ¯t ; ¯ηtg, we can obtain
the same conclusion similarly.
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